Wednesday, 11 November 2026

What Does a Successful Economic Diplomacy Policy of the Nepal Government Look Like in the Oceania Region?

This week, as Nepal’s delegation takes its place at COP31 in Antalya, a quietly remarkable fact sits in the negotiating room: the minister steering the talks is Australian. Chris Bowen holds the role of President of Negotiations, with Türkiye hosting and the Pacific shaping the agenda. For a country asking the world to answer for the 26 August Himalayan flood disaster, that is not a footnote. It is an opening.

It also points to something larger. Oceania is not a distant corner of Nepal’s foreign policy map. It is where our students, workers, tourists, remittances and climate arguments increasingly meet. The question is whether Kathmandu has a policy to match.

Countries in the Oceania region (Image: Encyclopædia Britannica)

1. Background

1.1 What is “Oceania”?

Oceania is conventionally divided into four sub-regions: Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), Melanesia (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu), Micronesia (Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia) and Polynesia (Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and others). It contains 14 sovereign states plus several territories.

For Nepal, the region splits into two diplomatic logics. Australia and New Zealand are the strategic anchors: advanced economies, world-class universities, major donors and home to fast-growing Nepali communities. The Pacific island states matter on a different axis. Like Nepal, they are small, climate-exposed and dependent on a few big partners, which makes them natural allies in multilateral forums.

1.2 When did the relationship begin?

Nepal and Australia established diplomatic relations on 15 February 1960. Nepal and New Zealand followed on 1 May 1961, with New Zealand becoming the 29th country to establish ties with Nepal.

The human links are older than the diplomatic ones. The 1953 Everest ascent by Tenzing Norgay and Sir Edmund Hillary bound Nepal and New Zealand together long before formal ties, and New Zealand has offered scholarships to Nepali students since the mid-1950s under the Colombo Plan.

2. The Current State of Affairs

2.1 Where relations stand with Australia and New Zealand

Australia. The relationship is institutionalised and active. A Bilateral Consultation Mechanism, created in 2017, held its third meeting in Kathmandu on 24 July 2026. A Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA), signed in February 2024, held its first Joint Committee meeting the day before. Cooperation concentrates on education, development assistance (an estimated A$27.2 million in 2023–24), local governance, water resources, humanitarian response, health, and climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction, including work with ICIMOD.

The numbers tell a lopsided story. Australia’s own data put merchandise trade with Nepal at A$161 million in 2022–23, of which Nepal’s exports were only about A$16 million, mainly carpets, cereal products and jewellery. Education is the real engine: Nepal is Australia’s third-largest source of international students, with around 62,000 Nepali students in 2023. The Nepali-born population in Australia is estimated at 213,580 by mid-2025, up from 122,506 at the 2021 census.

New Zealand. The relationship is warm and rooted in Everest. In May 2025 Winston Peters became the first New Zealand foreign minister to visit Nepal, naming agriculture, tourism, education, trade and investment as priorities. He announced a NZ$1.8 million, five-year partnership with the Himalayan Trust for school education in Solukhumbu, and said New Zealand wants an Air Services Agreement with Nepal. New Zealand has long waived tariffs on almost all imports from Nepal. Its diplomatic footprint is light, though: a consulate in Kathmandu, with the High Commission in New Delhi covering Nepal.

2.2 The status of economic diplomacy

The machinery is being built; the results lag behind it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs says it has prepared country-specific strategies with 20 countries so far, and the Foreign Minister has repeatedly said diplomacy must contribute to Nepal’s economic transformation, even urging honorary consuls to chase trade, investment, tourism and technology.

But the record on the ground is modest. Trade with Australia runs at roughly nine to one against Nepal. There is no direct flight to either country. There is no air services agreement with New Zealand yet. And our diplomatic presence in the region is thin. One telling detail from Australia’s own figures: its imports from Nepal in 2024, around A$359 million, were mostly tourism-related services rather than goods. Nepal’s edge in this region lies in services, experiences and high-value niche products, not bulk commodities.

2.3 How relations have evolved under the new government

Balendra Shah was sworn in as Prime Minister on 27 March 2026, after the Rastriya Swatantra Party won the first election since the Gen Z uprising of September 2025. Shisir Khanal leads the Foreign Ministry, and Finance Minister Swarnim Wagle holds a doctorate from the Australian National University, a personal connection to the region that is rare in a Nepali cabinet.

The tone has been warm and the diplomatic calendar busy. Foreign Minister Penny Wong congratulated the Prime Minister in April; Australia’s ambassador met Mr Khanal in April and the Prime Minister later in the year; New Zealand’s envoy called on the Foreign Minister in May. In May, Mr Khanal launched a study on the Nepali diaspora in Australia and said the government is exploring ways to make non-resident Nepali citizenship provisions more workable. In July came the consultation mechanism and TIFA meetings.

In fairness, much of this is continuity: both mechanisms predate the government. The new government’s real test is converting a good atmosphere into deliverables, such as flights, market access and investment, that ordinary Nepalis can feel.

3. The Way Forward

3.1 What effective economic diplomacy looks like

Success is measurable. In Oceania it would mean:

  • A different trade mix. Nepali exports - especially specialty tea and coffee, handicrafts, pashmina and wool products, and digital and tourism services - are growing faster than imports, and the deficit narrows year by year.

  • Direct, affordable connectivity to Sydney, Melbourne and Auckland.

  • Diaspora capital working at home. Nearly 35 per cent of surveyed Nepalis in Australia report formal investments there; the goal is a safe, bankable channel to invest in Nepal too.

  • Education as circulation, not one-way flow, with recognised qualifications, returnee pathways and joint programmes; exchange between Universities, rather than focus on scholarship quotas.

  • Missions that act as export engines, with trade desks, named focal persons and annual targets.

  • Joint results on climate, measured in finance delivered and lives protected.

3.2 Case studies: what works, and what it could become

The air route. Australia’s government has itself described Nepal as one of its largest passenger markets within non-stop range without a direct flight. An air services agreement signed in 2019 allows up to seven weekly services between Nepal and key Australian cities, and in 2019 more than 121,000 passengers flew from Kathmandu to Sydney, the largest such traffic of any country lacking a direct link. A direct or one-stop-same-aircraft service, whether run by Nepal Airlines or through a codeshare partner, would cut travel time, make family visits cheaper, open air cargo for fresh and high-value Nepali products, and put Nepal on every Australian traveller’s shortlist. New Zealand has signalled the same ambition through an air services agreement. Auckland, home to many Nepali families, is the obvious second destination.

Health: the Tilganga model. Nepal’s Tilganga Institute of Ophthalmology, built with the support of the Fred Hollows partnership, shows how a small development grant can become a self-sustaining institution that exports expertise and services across South Asia. Australia’s ambassador visited it again in July. The next step is to replicate the model in nursing and allied health training, telehealth and specialist exchanges, with accredited pathways that let Nepali clinicians train in Australia and New Zealand and return.

Education to skills. Australia Awards scholarships, university partnerships such as Federation University’s decade-long collaboration with Nepali institutions, and Australian-supported vocational training, point to a better model. Add mutual recognition of qualifications and structured reintegration for returnees, and education stops being only a tuition outflow. Proactively explore opportunities to mutually enhance skills of University faculty members by exchange between Universities.

The Hillary legacy as an economic asset. New Zealand’s Himalayan Trust work, schools, scholarships and the Khunde Hospital founded in 1966, is soft power with a proven record. Combined with New Zealand’s strengths in dairy, wool and agricultural technology, an area Nepal has long wanted to learn from, it can become co-branded Everest-region high value tourism and teacher-training partnerships.

3.3 People-to-people, business-to-business and government-to-government

People-to-people. The strongest card Nepal holds is its people. Over 213,000 Nepali-born residents in Australia and a growing community in New Zealand form a living bridge. Examples already exist: the friendship-city agreement between Wyndham City in Victoria and Godavari Municipality, signed in May; alumni networks of Australia Awards graduates; Nepali nurses, doctors and health journalists building professional links; and trekking and cultural tourism run by diaspora-owned operators. Nepal should treat these as a formal diplomatic channel, with a diaspora engagement strategy, workable non-resident citizenship provisions, and investment instruments that are simple and trusted.

Business-to-business. The TIFA’s Joint Committee and Australia’s Business Advisory Group in Kathmandu provide the platform; bilateral chambers and diaspora business networks provide the energy. Priority sectors: specialty tea and coffee (Australia’s 2025 imports of Nepali tea were barely over US$100,000, a gap that shows both the weakness and the room), handicrafts, wool and pashmina, organic and herbal products, IT services, adventure and wellness tourism, and agro-processing. Both countries enforce strict biosecurity rules, so a dedicated programme to help Nepali exporters meet quarantine and certification standards is as important as any tariff concession. The TIFA between Nepal and New Zealand must conclude as soon as possible to enable business-to-business cooperation.

Government-to-government. The task is to turn dialogue into agreements: an air services agreement with New Zealand and implementation of the Australian one; recognition of qualifications and skills; biosecurity protocols for Nepali exports; investment promotion and protection; and a standing climate and disaster-risk partnership. To promote trade and to forward economic cooperation, the TIFA between Nepal and New Zealand must be concluded as soon as possible. 

By sector:

  • Business: biosecurity-compliant exports, diaspora investment funds, TIFA-backed trade missions.

  • Tourism: direct flights, joint marketing around the 1953 Everest story, and post-disaster trail safety standards.

  • Health: nurse and specialist training pathways, telehealth, the Tilganga-style institution model.

  • Climate change: shared early-warning systems, glacial lake and flood-risk science, and finance access (below).

  • Education: scholarships tied to return pathways, joint degrees and vocational training with recognised credentials.

3.4 Climate compensation: where Oceania and Nepal can work together

The 26 August Himalayan disaster, centred on the Bhotekoshi river basin, has put loss and damage at the centre of Nepal’s foreign policy. Mr Khanal has said Nepal is moving from asking for aid to asking for climate justice and compensation. Initial reconstruction needs are estimated at roughly US$4.7 billion, about 10 per cent of GDP, while the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage has provisionally allocated US$21.6 million, US$20 million for recovery and the rest for oversight costs. The distance between those numbers is the whole argument.

Here is where Oceania can help, in four ways:

  1. Negotiating weight. As President of Negotiations at COP31, Australia controls the draft texts. Nepal should lobby, with Pacific allies, for explicit recognition of mountain regions and for a properly funded and replenished loss and damage fund. The concept Mr Khanal has called “Sagarmatha to the Sea”, linking Himalayan and Pacific vulnerability under one climate system, gives that coalition a story.

  2. A shared voice with the Pacific. Fiji, Tuvalu and their neighbours have spent years building climate diplomacy, including the Pacific Resilience Facility. Nepal can learn from that model and explore a Himalayan equivalent.

  3. Practical science and early warning. Australia’s existing support to ICIMOD’s work on resilience and disaster risk, and New Zealand’s expertise in geohazards and disaster response, can fund and build the data-sharing and early-warning systems Nepal needs.

  4. Finance beyond one fund. Nepal’s adaptation needs for 2025–2035 are estimated at US$18–20 billion. Bilateral windows, concessional finance and co-financing with Australia and New Zealand can complement multilateral money.

Two honest caveats. Australia is a major fossil fuel exporter, and the liability language Nepal prefers is contested by many developed countries. Success is likelier through concrete delivery and coalition-building than through blame. And Nepal’s demands will carry more weight if it shows it can absorb, report and deliver finance transparently.

4. Conclusion

Nepal’s ties with Australia and New Zealand are old, warm and, in commercial terms, thin. Sentiment is abundant; trade is scarce. A relationship built on students, remittances and Everest nostalgia has grown faster than the policies meant to serve it. The new government has the right vocabulary and the right institutions; it now needs delivery.

What needs to be done is not complicated. Fund and publish an Oceania strategy with annual targets. Close the air-connectivity gap. Channel diaspora wealth and skill into investment at home. Help exporters clear the quarantine and certification hurdles. And use COP31 to align Nepal with the Pacific so that a mountain’s losses are written into the world’s climate language.

Goodwill does not clear customs. Friendship does not fly Kathmandu to Sydney. Mountains and oceans share one climate; let them share one voice. Nepal does not need more handshakes in Oceania. It needs signed agreements, scheduled flights and results it can count. Diplomacy that does not change a family’s income is only a ceremony. Make it count.

*****